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Unauthorized Migrants as Global Workers
in the ASEAN Region
Graziano B6II>HI:AA6
Abstract
Globalization is a social phenomenon that by definition does not admit limitations. How-
ever, of the various factors of production, labor is not free to move where productivity is
highest. The traditional reasons limiting the movement of labor (political, economic, social
and cultural) have been reinforced by current discussions that link migration and terror-
ism. Thus, it is foreseeable that migration policies will become more restrictive in the near
future.
However, regardless of policies or sometimes in response to them, unauthorized
migration has developed in all countries. Is unauthorized migration the expression of the
globalization of foreign work? Is it a response to the futile attempts to limit the overreach-
ing power of globalization?
This paper will explore the significance of unauthorized migration as an outcome of
globalization by analyzing migration flows in Southeast Asia. There are currently three
migration subsystems in the region characterized by various types of population flows.
The paper will first examine the current trends of such flows. It will then examine the
characteristics of unauthorized migration and their significance for regional relations. It
will finally consider the following questions: Is the large unauthorized migration in the
region a consequence of the characteristics of the regional process adopted in ASEAN? Is
unauthorized migration the result of increasing globalization or does it depend on other
factors? Are migration policies consistent with regional and globalization policies?
Keywords: unauthorized migration, migration policies, globalization, ASEAN
In November  Malaysia vowed to reduce unauthorized migration, exercizing tougher
control on the entry of migrants in its territory and repatriating those present with
unauthorized status. Although Malaysia had embarked on many such operations in the
past, this one smacked of unusual determination and resolve. Even if  irregular
workers had been repatriated in , as reported by the Immigration Department, 
unauthorized Indonesians were still said to remain in the country,  in Peninsular
Malaysia and  in Sabah [AMN,  November ]. The government’s intention to
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repatriate  Indonesians a month led to riots among migrants detained in the Pekan
Nenas detention centre and the subsequent deportation of most of them. A similar move
of massive repatriation was announced in Sabah on February , , to tackle the
estimated  unauthorized migrants who had remained after the regularization of
 or who had since failed to renew their permits [AMN, 	 February ]. The
announcement was followed by quick action targeting the demolition of squatter shan-
ties and the repatriation of Filipinos and Indonesians.
On the other frontier, the one between Thailand and Burma, government action has
proceeded with similar determination. After the registration of some 	 migrants in
September , perhaps  mostly Burmese migrants are still considered to be in the
country in an unauthorized status. A four-month crackdown on unauthorized migrants
in major cities of nine provinces was announced in February, to last until June  [AMN,
 February ]. Burma agreed to cooperate in the process, taking repatriated workers
in the Myawaddy holding centre just across the border from Thailand’s Tak Province.
These references to current migration issues in two of the three most important
countries of destination within the ASEAN region are sufficient to indicate how relevant
unauthorized migration has become to government policies in the region. The signifi-
cance of this phenomenon and of the policies toward it deserve special attention because
it is occurring in the most successful regional experiment in Asia. Three questions need
to be addressed: Is the large unauthorized migration in the region a consequence of the
characteristics of the regional process adopted in ASEAN? Is unauthorized migration the
result of increasing globalization, or does it depend on other factors? Are migration
policies consistent with regional and globalization policies?
To answer these questions this article will first analyse migration flows within the
ASEAN region by examining three distinct migration subsystems. It will then examine
the dynamics of unauthorized migration in each of the three subsystems. Finally it will
discuss the three questions raised above.
Migration within the ASEAN Region
If migration within the ASEAN region is examined from a continental perspective, it
appears to constitute one fairly coherent migration system. A system can be understood
as comprising a group of countries with one, or more than one, core country, which
functions as a destination, and others as periphery countries from which migrants
originate. Because of differences in demographic, economic, social, and political contexts
(see selected indicators in Table  ), which serve as a premise to the population move-
ment, and because of specific linkages of various kinds (historical, cultural, technolog-
ical), which function as triggers to the actual movement, migration has taken place and
continues to take place reinforced by feedback and adjustments, and by the facilitative
G. B6II>HI:AA6 : Unauthorized Migrants as Global Workers in the ASEAN Region
351
role of migration networks [Kritz et al. ].
In fact, ASEAN includes some of the major countries of origin of migration (the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Burma) and also some of the countries with the largest
number of migrants (Malaysia and Thailand) (Tables  and  ) or the highest share of
migrants in their populations (Singapore and Malaysia). When examined from a closer
perspective, however, the ASEAN region presents some distinctive characteristics. Most
of the immigrant population originates within the system, except for some flows that are
exogenous, most notably the one from Bangladesh toward Malaysia. At the same time,
Table  Stock of Authorized Migrants in Selected ASEAN Countries (thousands)
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a Registered during SeptemberOctober  AMN,  October .
b February  Battistella : .
c  AMN,  August . Distribution recalculated based on ILO estimates, 
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a  figure.
b As a proxy, the ASEAN rate of GDP growth and the ASEAN inflation rate are computed as a
weighted average of its  member countries figures using PPP-GDP of the IMF-WEO of May




countries of origin also exchange migrants within other systems. For example, migration
flows from the Philippines to non-ASEAN destinations are more substantial than those
within the region. Finally, migration flows within the region appear polarized in specific
directions. For this reason, it is better to examine three subsystems of migration within
the ASEAN regionthe Malay Peninsula (including Singapore); the Brunei-Indonesia-
Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA); and the Northern ASEAN
countries. I recognize that these major groupings are not economically and politically
cohesive.
The Malay Peninsula
The Malay Peninsula constitutes the most dynamic economic region within ASEAN.
Malaysia and Singapore combined (including East Malaysia) were responsible for 
percent of the total GNP of ASEAN in . Even more significantly, they accounted for
 percent of ASEAN exports. This economically dynamic area, however, is deficient in
population (approximately  million); hence it needs foreign workers. As of the 
census, foreign workers constituted  percent of the workforce in Singapore, while the
share of foreign workers in the Malaysian work force was  percent.
The origin of foreign labour in this area goes back to the colonial era, when the
British Empire introduced workers from India and China. The heritage of those move-
ments is particularly evident in the multiethnic composition of the populations of
Singapore and Malaysia. The separation of Singapore from Malaysia did not sever
traditional ties. In fact, Malaysians were originally the only migrants allowed to work in
Singapore, and they remain as the traditional source of foreign labour. In addition,
Malaysian workers commute daily between the southern Malaysian state of Johor and
Singapore.
Although they can be considered part of the same migration system because of
economic links, Singapore and Malaysia have developed different migration policies.
Table  Estimated Numbers of Unauthorized Migrants in Selected Asian Countries
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a Estimate from MN a.
b Estimate from AMN  October .
c Add approximately 
 Filipinos still irregular in Sabah.
d Dawes : www.asiaweek.com
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The differences reflect different initial conditions as well as differences in the pace of
absorbing the local workforce.
Singapore early factored migration into the growth process of its economy. It
adopted a different treatment for professionals and highly skilled workers from that for
unskilled migrants. Although it encouraged the contribution of professionals, offering
them incentives to remain in Singapore and acquire permanent residence, it discouraged
the migration of unskilled workers. Control policies were aimed not just at making
migrant labour precarious (through lack of long-term residence possibilities) but also at
profiting from it by collecting a levy imposed on employers who hired foreign workers.
When it became apparent that the demand for migrant labour was increasing, because
migrants performed jobs that local workers shunned and that could not be eliminated
through automation, the government adopted policies that discouraged an increasing
dependency ratio [Wong ].
Accurate data on the number and origin of migrants in Singapore are not available.
Newspapers have reported that in a population of  million people the number of
foreigners has reached 			 [AMN,  August 
		], of whom perhaps 					 are
migrants. Women domestic workers constitute an important component (perhaps one
fifth) of the foreign workforce and come mostly from the Philippines (three quarters),
Indonesia, and Sri Lanka [Yeoh et al. : ]. Migrants are also widely employed in
construction; most come from Thailand, Bangladesh, and India.
Singapore’s migration policy is often characterized as pragmatic, aimed at maximiz-
ing the contribution of foreign workers and minimizing social costs. Social costs are
minimized, as mentioned earlier, by discouraging the hiring of unskilled workers, while
encouraging highly skilled workers, particularly in the area of the new economy, to settle
in Singapore. Social costs are also minimized by discouraging unskilled migrants from
remaining in Singapore or even intermarrying with the local population. The pragma-
tism of Singapore’s policy was particularly evident during the economic crisis of ,
when the government encouraged employers to retain workers not on the basis of
nationality, but rather productivity. Measures against unauthorized migration are
severe, including caning for those caught violating immigration policies. Punishment is
meted not just for hiring unauthorized migrants; providing lodging to unauthorized
migrants also constitutes an offence punishable by imprisonment and fines.
Immigration to Malaysia originated in the 	s, as local workers moved out of
agriculture and construction to better-paying jobs. Migrants came mostly from Indone-
sia and settled in Malaysia under a laissez-faire policy. The Malaysian govenment began
to control the movement of foreign workers with the  Medan Pact with Indonesia,
which was followed by similar agreements with the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Thai-
land. The state took a more proactive role in the 	s, particularly with the intention to
reduce the large number of unauthorized migrants. Nevertheless, various amnesties and
repatriations did not substantially modify the situation. Perhaps the largest reduction of
 	 
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foreign labour took place in , in reaction to the financial crisis, but the current
repatriation of Indonesians indicates it was an unfinished job. Overall, Malaysian
migration policy can be considered flexible and aimed at promoting growth and upgrad-
ing industry [Kanapathy ]. Like Singapore, Malaysia does not make public its data
on migration. Recent newspaper reports indicate the number of registered foreign
workers in Malaysia to be , of whom 	 are Indonesians,  Bangladeshis,

 Nepalese,  Filipinos, 	 Burmese, 
 Thais,  Pakistanis, and the rest
from other countries. In addition, approximately 
 are considered unauthorized
migrants, most of them from Indonesia and Bangladesh. Occupations are clustered by
ethnic origin. Thus Indonesians are predominantly in plantation work and construction,
Bangladeshis in manufacturing and services, and Filipinos in services.
Malaysia’s frequent policy changes make it difficult to have an overall grasp of the
current system. For instance, hiring for specific occupations has been restricted and
relaxed at various times, as has been the hiring of particular ethnic groups. The hiring
of Filipinos was suspended in October , but was lifted in January  after Indone-
sians were placed at the bottom of the list following their involvement in riots [AMN, 
January ]. Like Singapore, Malaysia encourages the hiring of professionals; in
February, the hiring of foreign doctors was approved. It also aims at reducing the
number of unauthorized migrants, an objective it has pursued during the past  years
with limited results.
In addition to the Philippines and Thailand, which send large numbers of migrants to
Singapore, the major sources of migration to this subsystem are Indonesia and Bangla-
desh, two highly populated countries with social and economic conditions that fuel
instability. Ethnic clashes and independence movements in Indonesia have subsided
under President Megawati, but their underlying causes have not found a solution.
Formal labour migration from Indonesia, which experienced a large transfer of popula-
tion within its own territory through the government’s programme of transmigrasi,
started in the s and consisted mostly of domestic workers heading for the Middle
East, Malaysia, and Singapore. Preceding and overshadowing the formal programme,
however, has been the unauthorized movement of migrants who enter Peninsular Malay-
sia by crossing the Straits of Malacca. Religious, linguistic, and cultural proximity have
facilitated this unauthorized transfer to Malaysia. Intermediaries (illegal recruiters,
travel agents, and transport operators) play a prominent role. Several agreements and
regularizations have not succeeded in bringing order to a movement that is based on
marked demographic and economic disparities between the two countries, with their
close borders and well-established migration networks. In recent years, however, Indone-
sia has also developed significant migration flows toward other destinations. About
	 Indonesians, mostly domestic workers, are in Hong Kong, and  are in Taiwan,
working in domestic and care services and also in manufacturing.
Bangladesh also sends most of its migrant labour force to other destinations, partic-
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ularly the Middle East; and an unspecified number of Bangladeshis, perhaps , have
moved to the Indian state of Assam. Nonetheless, ties established through migration
flows will ensure that Bangladesh remains an important source of migrant labour in
Peninsular Malaysia. At the same time, an increasing diversification of origins is
expected, particularly after the recent action taken by the Malaysian government to
reduce the number of unauthorized Indonesians and to relegate them to the bottom of the
hiring list (domestic workers excluded). As soon as this happened, India and Nepal
moved to secure a niche in that labour market. Malaysia’s Human Resource Ministry has
expressed the intention to source workers from Vietnam, particularly in the construction
and plantation sectors [AMN,  March ].
The BIMP-EAGA Subregion
Because of its location, its history, and the configuration of its economy, East Malaysia
has developed autonomous immigration procedures. On the one hand, the two states,
Sabah in particular, have become the destinations of migrants mainly from the Philip-
pines and Indonesia. On the other, the Sultanate of Brunei, with its high standard of
living, due to the export of oil, also attracts migrants. Therefore, this region can be
considered a separate migration subsystem within the ASEAN region. The boundaries of
this subsystem coincide with the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN
Growth Area commonly referred to as BIMP-EAGA.
Established in , BIMP-EAGA covers the sultanate of Brunei, East Malaysia
(Sabah, Sarawak, and Labuan), Mindanao and Palawan in the Philippines, and 
provinces in the Indonesian islands of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Irian Jaya. It
is a vast region of  million square kilometres and a population of approximately 
million. The intention in establishing the growth area was to take advantage of the
opportunities it provides and create incentives for the economic growth of the least
developed areas in each nation (except for Brunei). Natural resources (forests, oil, gas, and
water) are plentiful; and agriculture specializes in coconut and corn in Mindanao, rubber
in Indonesia, and oil palm in Indonesia and Malaysia. Industrialization in the region at
large is below the level of the respective countries, however, and wages (except in East
Kalimantan) are also lower than national wages. Complementarities are not significant
enough to suggest a spectacular increase of intraregional trade; but there are possibilities,
particularly in tourism and labour complementarities, as well as in attracting more
foreign direct investment.
Since its establishment, BIMP-EAGA set up air and sea linkages to facilitate transpor-
tation and communication, though the private sector did not respond as expected to the
idea. BIMP-EAGA seems to be having a second life since President Arroyo revived the
attention of the other partners in . Regardless of the success of the growth area,
however, the region has developed migratory flows that respond not only to economic
but also to historical factors.
  	
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Sabah has long been part of a geopolitical zone with linkages to both Malaysia and
the Philippines. It remains a source of territorial dispute between the two countries,
although the Philippines’ recent establishment of a de facto consulate in Kota Kinabalu
indicates that the Philippines may consider the possibility of obtaining sovereignty over
Sabah as remote. Population movement to Sabah (also to Sarawak) from Western
Mindanao in the Philippines and from Kalimantan in Indonesia began in precolonial
times, and the state boundaries established by colonial powers had limited impact. The
importation of labour during British colonial rule and the arrival of Filipinos seeking
refuge during the conflict in Mindanao in the s reinforced the migrant population,
which has now reached about  and is managed by the autonomous State Immigra-
tion Department. As in Peninsular Malaysia, efforts in Sabah and Sarawak to bring
unauthorized migration under control have met with little success. The largest operation
was the regularization programme implemented in , which registered 	
 mi-
grants, including 
	 Indonesians and 
	 Filipinos [Kurus 	: 
	]. Malaysian
authorities estimated that approximately 	 failed to register. Some  un-
authorized migrants are said to remain in the state, and a new crackdown was launched
on February 
. Toward the end of March,  migrants were deported from Sabah, of
whom 

 were Filipinos, 
 were Indonesians, and  were of other nationalities.
Migrants in Sabah are involved in the same sectors (forestry, plantation, construc-
tion, manufacturing, and domestic service) as those in Peninsular Malaysia. But the level
of settlement is higher because nearly 
 Indonesians and Filipinos live with their
dependents. In addition to employment in sectors traditionally associated with migrants,
they are also involved in various aspects of the informal economy.
Similar to the economies of the Gulf countries, which depend largely on oil exports,
the economy of Brunei relies heavily on foreign labour. In 		 immigrants already
represented  percent of the labour force in the private sector. Government efforts to
reduce foreign labour have not been very successful [Mani ]. Accurate figures on the
number and origin of migrants are not available, but Indonesians number perhaps 
,
and other migrants come from the Philippines and the neighbouring Malaysian states.
Besides Indonesia, the other major country of origin for this subsystem is the
Philippines. In fact, the Philippines is the country with the largest and most developed
overseas labour programme in Asia. Even so, the ASEAN region does not constitute a
major destination for Filipino migrants. As shown in Table , only  percent of all
Filipino workers were deployed to ASEAN countries in 
. The highest number of
Filipino migrants within ASEAN is in Sabah, but it is a migration flow that developed
largely outside the formal system of recruitment and deployment. Filipinos in Sabah
include those who fled to Sabah in the early s and obtained refugee status. In April

, there were  Filipino refugees in the state living in  settlements, with 	
children studying in local primary and secondary schools [AMN,  April 
]. Their
refugee status was revoked in July, but they were allowed to remain provided they could
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secure a work permit. A second group comprises migrants in possession of a regular
work permit ( according to some estimates), while the third group is made up of
perhaps  unauthorized migrants [AMN,  July ].
Whereas Filipinos in Peninsular Malaysia and in Singapore are employed mainly in
the service sector, particularly in domestic services, those in Sabah are employed in a
variety of occupations. The Filipino population in West Malaysia and Singapore is
mostly female, but in Sabah many Filipinos have dependents. The small stock of
Filipinos in Brunei (fewer than ) is composed mostly of labourers and teachers.
Northern ASEAN Countries
Before becoming a labour-importing county, Thailand played an important role in the
movement of population in the region that comprises the Northern ASEAN countries. In
the 	s it was a country of first asylum for refugees, providing assistance to Vietnam-
ese, Cambodians, and Laotians. Between 	 and 	 it assisted nearly 
 million
refugees. Approximately  Karens from Burma are still in refugee camps.
After the 	s Thailand developed an overseas labour programme, sending workers
mostly toward the Middle East. A diplomatic incident in Saudi Arabia in  reduced
the flow of overseas workers to  a year; but the flow increased again in the s
(Table  ) with the opening of job opportunities in Taiwan, where Thai workers are the
largest group ( at the end of July ).
While continuing to send migrants abroad, Thailand also rapidly became a destina-
tion for migrant labour from neighbouring countries, exemplifying the concept of
migration transition in Southeast Asia. The transition, however, is not occurring rapidly,
and the 	 crisis revived the need to send workers abroad.
Labour immigration to Thailand developed rapidly and unexpectedly in the s,
Table  Overseas Filipino Workers Deployed to ASEAN Countries, 
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reaching unforeseen dimensions. Al-
though the prerequisites were in place
that is, rapid economic growth through-
out the s and decreasing unemploy-
ment in Thailand, with stagnation and
instability in the neighbouring coun-
triesnot many expected that approxi-
mately one million migrants would be
working in Thailand in just a few years.
The vast majority ( percent) have
come from Burma, while the rest are
from Cambodia and Laos. Employment
in the booming construction industry of
the precrisis years and in agriculture
functioned as the main magnets. Per-
haps  percent of the labour force in fisheries is Burmese [Stern : ]. The lack of
a clear immigration policy and the easy recourse to irregular venues facilitated a largely
irregular immigration flow. To try to manage this huge number of unauthorized
migrants, the government implemented a regularization programme in  by allowing
employers to register migrants. The initiative applied to only  of 	 provinces and
produced a little more than 
 registered migrants. A large majority of migrants did
not participate in the registration programme, either because they were not entitled to it,
or because employers were unwilling to shoulder the registration fee of $ and the bond
of $ imposed by the government. In addition, of those who were regularized, not many
renewed their annual working permit or remained with the same employer.
The crisis forced a substantial rethinking of Thailand’s immigration policy. Faced
with an abrupt increase in unemployment, the government turned to the repatriation of
foreign workers in order to provide job opportunities to domestic workers. It targeted

 workers for repatriation to their countries by the end of  and more in .
When repatriation started, it became apparent that some industries (e. g., fisheries, rice
mills, swine raisers, rubber growers) were adversely affected by the loss of foreign
workers. Thai workers were not replacing the departing migrant workers. The govern-
ment made a new effort to bring unauthorized migration under control in , when

	 migrants were registered in September and October and given six-month renew-
able work permits [MN a]. Recently new initiatives were taken, such as the setting
up of a task force to repatriate the remaining unauthorized migrants.
In this migration subsystem, Vietnam occupies a distinctive place. Between 	 and
, 
 refugees left Vietnam, of whom 	
 were resettled and 
 returned to
Vietnam voluntarily [UNHCR 	:  ]. When the refugee crisis was resolved in  by
the Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Vietnamese communities established in North
Table  Annual Outflow of Migrant Workers:
Selected ASEAN Countries, 
(thousands)













































a Adi : Table  
b POEA 
c Soonthorndhada : Table  
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America and Australia induced additional migration for family reunification. Between
 and  another stream of Vietnamese migrants moved to countries of the Soviet
bloc for work. More recently, an agreement signed with Taiwan in May  has
provided an important destination for overseas labour. At the end of July , there
were  Vietnamese in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector and care services.
The description of labour mobility in the region, clustered around three subsystems,
presents several common aspects. First, the absolute number of migrants is not a huge
figure compared with the total population of the region (less than  percent). In fact, the
total number of migrants in the three subsystems can be estimated at 	 million (Tables
 and  ), not considering the foreigners in the countries of origin, who do not constitute
a large number. It is necessary to cite estimates since the available data are not reliable.
In addition, the number of unauthorized migrants is not easily ascertained. Thus
migration does not constitute in itself a phenomenon of alarming proportions. Second, in
the receiving countries, the relative importance of migrant labour varies considerably.
Foreign labour constitutes  percent of the labour force in Singapore,  percent in
Malaysia, and  percent in Thailand. Although such numbers do not present a problem
to an economy or society in times of prosperity, they become an issue in times of crisis.
Third, the number of unauthorized migrants in the region is absolutely disproportionate,
constituting perhaps 
 percent of the total number of migrants. This indicates that
policies are most likely not in step with the needs of the economy or, to put it in different
terms, that the demand for migrant labour (and conversely, the pressure to migrate) are
larger than what policies intend to accommodate. A better understanding of un-
authorized migration in the region requires a further examination of its dynamics.
The Dynamics of Unauthorized Migration within the ASEAN Region
Unauthorized migration, as briefly described in the three migration subsystems, is not
purely the result of a demand for labour from labour-scarce economies, matched by
available manpower from countries with a high level of unemployment, that cannot be
addressed by adequate policy measures. A variety of other aspects must also be
considered to understand the extraordinary development of unauthorized migration
within ASEAN.
First is the geographic aspect. Geographic contiguity between Indonesia and Malay-
sia, between Burma and Thailand, and between western Mindanao and Sabah provides
opportunities for border crossing to people who cannot or do not know how to follow
formal procedures. In this respect, most unauthorized migration within ASEAN is of the
border-crossing type, unlike that in other areas, such as East Asia, where it consists
mostly of unauthorized stay after legal entry. Obviously, the possibility to cross borders




very long or traditionally porous.
Second is the historical aspect. In the development of Asian states, the jurisdiction
over peripheral areas, often forested and mountainous, shifted according to whichever
state was strongest; such areas sometimes straddled two or several states. The move-
ment of population in the areas followed dynamics that were not determined by political
sovereignty. The establishment of clearer borders by colonial powers led people to
discover that movement within traditional economic areas entailed crossing interna-
tional borders [IOM ].
Third is the importance of intermediaries. Migration traditionally relies on social
networks to provide the necessary information to facilitate departure, entry, and inser-
tion in the country of destination. In the case of unauthorized migration, such networks
are essential and offer a vast typology. Often intermediation for unauthorized migration
combines and colludes with the formal labour-recruiting system put in place in Asian
countries to facilitate the expansion of the overseas labour programmes.
Considering these aspects, which are not unique or clearly specific to the ASEAN
case, it seems advisable to go beyond the macro perspective to acquire a better under-
standing of the dynamics of unauthorized migration. To explore the phenomenon within
specific contexts, in  several of my colleagues and I conducted a four-country study
of the experience of unauthorized migrants. The study covered two countries of origin,
Indonesia and the Philippines, and two countries of destination, Malaysia and Thailand.
Some of the results from the study are relevant to the current discussion.
At the core of unauthorized migration from Indonesia is the migrants’ need for
information. The need covers the whole migration process, from its origin at the village
to employment in Malaysia. In most cases percent in the sample interviewed by Adi
[]migrants obtain information through friends and relatives. Often, friends and
relatives can also provide assistance, particularly in the final stage of the process,
securing employment and perhaps a place to stay. Professional intermediaries, called
tekong, also play a crucial role. Sometimes their role is limited to taking the prospective
migrant to a recruiting agent, sometimes it involves financing the cost of migration
(which the migrant must repay twice over), and sometimes it covers the whole process.
The tekong is often a former migrant who has established a network of contacts in
Malaysia, knows how to obtain documentation, and accompanies the migrant to the
employer in Malaysia. The picture that emerges from the Indonesia-Malaysia flow is one
of a migration system in which social networks play a decisive role. Intermediaries offer
services throughout the migration process, but relatives and friends are more trusted
because they can provide assistance while the migrant is abroad.
Unauthorized migration from the Philippines to ASEAN destinations is primarily to
Sabah. Filipino migration to Sabah is organized around two major routes. The unofficial
one, known as the Southern backdoor, originates from the small islands of the Sulu
Archipelago, and is part of traditional trading that goes back to time immemorial.
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Another unofficial route to Sabah originates from Palawan. People involved in the
trading do not consider going to Sabah as going to a foreign country. Perhaps  percent
of residents in Tawi-Tawi have relatives in Sabah [Battistella et al. : ]. Travelling
in small vessels, migrants go to Sabah for various reasonsto look for a job, to visit
relatives, or to buy goods for training. As there is no immigration office in the small
islands, the movement is outside the official system. The official route entails passing
through immigration requirements in Zamboanga City, which is far away and impracti-
cal to reach. The second route transports migrants by way of a ferry from Zamboanga
City to Sandakan, Sabah. The ferry service was established in  as part of the
BIMP-EAGA accord. It is the legal gateway to Sabah, as passengers must travel with
documents. This does not imply that unauthorized migration does not occur, since
documents are sometimes forged and passengers may enter Sabah as visitors and then
remain beyond the period of stay allowed them and find work. Smugglers use this route
to traffic women to Sabah and Labuan to work as prostitutes.
A different dynamic of unauthorized migration from the Philippines to ASEAN
countries involves migrants, mostly domestic workers, in Singapore. Little information
is available on the volume of unauthorized migration to Singapore, except for the
increasing number of migrants arrested and repatriated (	 in , 
	 in ) and
the fact that many unauthorized migrants are employed in the construction sector.
However, Filipinos can be considered unauthorized migrants not so much for breaking
Singapore law as for not complying with Philippine regulations. Most Filipinos in
Singapore out of  according to some estimates [Yeoh et al. : 
]have entered
Singapore with a tourist visa and been employed through a preapproved work permit
arranged by the employment agency. Leaving as tourists to find employment as
migrants is considered unauthorized migration in the Philippines because the migrants
circumvent the process requiring the submission of a standard labour contract, passing
physical tests, attending predeparture seminars, and contributing to the welfare fund.
Measures in the Philippines against unauthorized migration have been directed
mostly against illegal recruitment. The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
 contains detailed provisions defining illegal recruitment, which can be committed
also by a licensed agency, and harsh penalties for violators. Nevertheless, the law has not
succeeded in eliminating illegal recruitment because the demand for migration remains
strong. Many cases are settled outside of court, and perpetrators are allowed to continue
operating.
From the perspective of the country of destination, unauthorized migration is a
parallel system that continues to function alongside the formal system of foreign-labour
recruitment. The formal system is the typical procurement of labour for employers who
use the services of local employment agencies, which are in contact with recruitment
agencies in the country of origin. Unauthorized migration instead consists in entry to




relatives, and the procurement of employment on site. Interestingly, Wong and Afrizal
[] have compared this system to the arrival of Chinese workers in Malaya during the
nineteenth century. Whereas Indian labourers obtained assisted passage from rubber
companies, Chinese workers paid their way and consequently entered a much more open
labour market. “One consequence was that the Chinese labour was highly mobile,
moving constantly in search of higher wages and better working conditions, whilst
Indian labour was confined to the low-wage plantation economy” [ibid.: ].
The results of the study in both pairs of countries emphasized the prevalent role of
social networks in unauthorized migrationwith intermediaries having a say in it,
benefiting from it, and sometimes victimizing their clients. That role has significance for
policies to control unauthorized migration. Furthermore, the historical parallel with
earlier experiences of foreign labour in Malaysia show that some dynamics have the
possibility to prosper. Consequently, “the current system of migrant labour regulation,
namely the establishment of a rigid system of migrant labour recruitment on the one
hand, and the criminalization of informal channels of recruitment on the other, is
unrealistic, counter-productive and damaging” [ibid.: ].
Research in Thailand by Amarapibal et al. [] has shed light on another aspect of
the dynamics of unauthorized migration. I have already indicated that migration to
Thailand increased dramatically in the s, coinciding with growing development,
particularly before the  crisis, as well as with difficult conditions in the military
regime of Burma. In  Thailand changed its migration policy from a laissez-faire
approach to requiring registration, allowing 	 provinces to hire migrants from neigh-
bouring Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. New requirements were introduced in the years
following the crisis, for the purpose of reducing the number of migrants and providing
employment opportunities to Thais. A quota system was adopted, and registrations for
the year  were allocated, based on employers who had registered workers in .
This system was criticized for being shortsighted and limited; dependents were not
included, and it did not provide adequate protection to workers. The number of
registered migrants (usually fewer than 
) perhaps never surpassed  percent of
the migrant population.
Unauthorized migration to Thailand, however, presents a variety of situations.
According to Amarapibal and her colleagues, the low-income border province of Tak has
a migrant population of perhaps 
, mostly Burmese, largely employed in factories,
which were relocated along the border precisely to take advantage of low-cost migrant
labour. Unlike single migrants employed in factories, migrants with families work in
agricultural jobs. Ninety percent of the migrants interviewed crossed from Burma
without much recruitment assistance, and most found jobs by themselves or with the
help of relatives. The same percentage of migrants interviewed had relatives in the
province. Most maintained ties with families in Burma;  percent sent remittances
regularly and  percent visited their families once a year. Only  percent knew of the
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registration process, and even fewer were aware that the employer was responsible to
pay the registration fees.
The coastal province of Samutsakhon, south of Bangkok, presents a different scena-
rio. Samutsakhon has the fifth highest income among the  provinces in Thailand.
Migrants, who numbered 	 in 	


, form  percent of the province’s population.
Ninety percent of them are below 
 years of age, and most are from Burma; of these, 
percent are Mon, 	 percent are Burmese, and  percent are Karen. Sixty percent are
married. Family members accompany most migrants, although not all migrants bring
their children with them.
Unlike the group in the border province of Tak,  percent of migrants in Samutsa-
khon sought the assistance of recruiting agents, while the rest relied on relatives and
friends. In most cases the migrants contacted agents or their social networks in Burma
before starting the migration process. Thai agents were used only for crossing and
transportation. More than  percent did not cross the border at a checkpoint. Those
who did so had border passes, which allow for only a short stay and in specific areas. The
migrants obtained employment through friends or agents, or by themselves almost in
equal proportion. They found employment in fishing and fish processing, which are the
main industries of the province. Awareness of registration and its benefits is greater in
Samutsakhon than in Tak, but the rate of registration is far from satisfactory. Migrants
have grown sceptical of the system because registration costs, which should be borne by
the employers, are passed on to the workers. Some migrants find little advantage in
registering, claiming harassment by enforcers who extort money from them. Examining
the correlation between registration and other variables, Amarapibal et al. [ibid.: 	]
found that only a few were significant. Women were more likely to be registered than
men ( percent versus  percent); those employed in industries were more likely to be
registered than those in the agricultural sector and fishing. Knowledge of the system or
the rights of workers did not have much effect on registration.
The registration process that took place in 	

, although insufficient to cover the
whole migrant population, appears to have been a temporary measure pointing toward a
more comprehensive change of the migration policy. The benefits of the recent approach
is that it was not limited to specific occupations or specific provinces, thus discarding the
quota system, which relied heavily on the ties between local businesses or politicians and
central authorities. “It provides a system of health and welfare support; it can assist
greatly in reducing corruption; it can provide a more secure environment for a greater
number of people” [ibid.: 	
].
Unauthorized migration in Thailand has acquired the characteristics of a flow
sustained by some local industries that have organized to take advantage of migrant
labour to the point that there is no substitution for it. In fact, even during the region’s
economic crisis unemployed Thai workers did not want to replace migrants in jobs that




situation of unauthorized migrant labour by not providing social benefits and often by
paying below-minimum wages. In this situation it is not surprising that control policies,
which simply aim to reduce irregular migration by repatriating migrants, have been
highly ineffective because the demand for migrant labour is embedded in the system.
Migrants are widely available and capable of entering the system through well-organized
social networks, and officials can also benefit through extortions.
The exploration in this section of the dynamics of unauthorized migration within the
ASEAN region has revealed the existence of two major systems. One derives from the
shifting of borders between contiguous countries, with a long tradition that predates the
current political borders drawn by colonial powers. The other is the result of develop-
ment in sectors that require menial, dirty, unskilled jobs, or jobs with little social prestige.
The availability of foreign workers for such jobs, which are normally shunned by most
local populations, allows those sectors to maximize profits by employing underpaid
foreign labour rather than modernizing those sectors. The involvement of social net-
works and recruitment agencies is essential for unauthorized migration to continue.
Unauthorized Migration and Policies within ASEAN Countries
Having described migration within the ASEAN region as organized into three distinct
subsystems, and having explored the dynamics of unauthorized migration, it is now
possible for me to attempt to address the questions posed at the beginning of the article.
It is an initial exploration, as appropriate data would be needed for more conclusive
answers.
Migration and the Regional Process of ASEAN
ASEAN was established in , during the cold war. It is no surprise that its charter did
not consider the movement of labour. In fact, of the three objectives set forth for the
association, the predominant one was promoting regional peace and stability. Initiatives
toward economic cooperation were taken, but not with a vision of an integrated regional
economy. This occurred in , at the Fourth Summit in Singapore, when strong
American leadership toward economic liberalization affected the international climate.
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was created with the primary objective of facilitat-
ing trade among the member countries by lowering tariffs to a  percent range by .
The date was later advanced to 	 and then again, in spite of the financial crisis, to .
Thus, for the original six member countries of ASEAN, AFTA is already a fact. Neverthe-
less, the circulation of labour remains a subject on which the association does not want
to engage; and since the tragedy of September , governments have become less
interested in multilateral approaches to the subject.
The reasons for avoiding discussing migration are various and understandable.
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Countries of destination, in particular, oppose consideration of this subject because they
want to maintain their freedom to regulate migration according to policies that are in
their national interest, unencumbered by limitations imposed by international agree-
ments. Countries of origin, on the other hand, desire more protective measures and
benefits for their nationals, which would diminish the benefits that foreign labour brings
to destination countries in terms of flexibility in the labour market. Discussing migration
implies examining the character of societies, for migrants are not commodities and
require some form of integration. Political, social, and cultural differences among
member countries present obstacles to consensus on this issue. Furthermore, migration
has security implications, which need to be addressed from a national perspective.
Perhaps the same reasons would constitute an argument for a regional approach to
migration, however. The security concern, in particular, which tends to demonize
migrants and regard them as potential terrorists, should bring the issue of unauthorized
migrants to the table, since it is difficult to curb unauthorized migration without the
cooperation of the country of origin. In this respect, some bilateral arrangements have
been made, particularly for the orderly repatriation of unauthorized migrants. However,
these are limited to dialogue on logistics, such as providing the ship for the transport of
migrants or setting up a camp for processing repatriated migrants.
Unauthorized migration cannot be approached in isolation from migration in general
or from economic integration in particular. If the experience of the European Union can
be of any help, it is important to observe that the circulation of labour among member
countries was envisioned from the very beginning, together with the design of economic
integration. That it took the EU  years to fully implement it only attests to the need for
continued discussion, rather than shelving the subject. Some movement of unauthorized
migrants indicates, as illustrated in the previous sections, that people already perceive a
level of integration that goes beyond political boundaries. Unauthorized migration can
be properly addressed only when a regional framework for migration, based on human
rights and common objectives, exists.
Unauthorized Migration and Globalization
The climate surrounding the discussion of globalization is certainly much more cautious
than it was a few years ago, particularly before the Asian crisis. In the meantime, we
have witnessed popular protest against relentless globalization, which is perceived as
beneficial only to some and managed in an undemocratic fashion. Moreover, some recent
episodes, such as the increased tariffs on steel in the US and then in the EU, and the
increased tariffs on cement in the Philippines, expose the hypocrisy of liberalization
ideology. Touted as the panacea for all development problems, liberalization is quickly
abandoned as governments adopt protectionist measures to defend their national inter-
ests.
Globalization remains a complex phenomenon that includes much more than just
  
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trade issues. It is here to stay in some modified form or other. In considering the
relationship between globalization and migration, it is important to avoid simplistic
conclusions. (For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Stalker [].) The Asian
crisis could be considered the worst example of globalization woes, particularly the
damaging effect that open financial markets can have when they are not accompanied by
a system of checks and balances. However, the effects that the crisis was supposed to
have on migrationmassive repatriation from countries of destination, increased migra-
tion pressure from countries of origin, increased levels of unauthorized migrationwere
not as dramatic as expected [Battistella and Asis ]. Large repatriations took place
from Malaysia, Thailand, and, to a lesser extent, South Korea. Soon afterward, however,
the number of foreign workers in those countries rose to previous levels. An increase in
migration, such as that which occurred in Indonesia, was due mostly to the opening of
new opportunities, such as in Taiwan, rather than to unbearable migration pressures in
Indonesia. As for unauthorized migration, there is no evidence that it increased, perhaps
because of better border controls.
Within ASEAN it might be too soon to craft a new analysis of the relationship
between globalization and migration. Using trade as a proxy for globalization (and the
implementation of AFTA as an indication of increased globalization within the region),
one could argue that an increase in migration within the region is to be expected. This
is in line with Martin’s [] “migration hump” hypothesis, which postulates an initial
rise in migration as a result of increased trade, but one that tapers off in the long run. In
examining the issue, one should bear in mind the three migration subsystems described
at the beginning of this article. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a sudden change in the
direction of migration flows within the region. Not much is expected in the short term in
the North ASEAN subsystem, as AFTA is not yet applicable to the countries of origin in
that subsystem. Likewise, the Eastern Malaysia subsystem, where trade is not that
significant, will not be much affected by the implementation of AFTA. The most
significant change may occur in the Malay Peninsula subsystem, which has at its core
Malaysia and Singapore, the two countries with the highest volume of trade. Together
they account for almost  percent of exports within ASEAN (Table  ). Both countries
have toughened their migration policies. It must be remembered that globalization
implies the free circulation of goods, capital, and services, but not the free circulation of
labour. Although this might appear to be a contradiction within the system, security
concerns after September  have reinforced migration controls, and the potential impact
of trade in the short run will be offset by migration policies to the extent that they are
enforceable.
Unauthorized Migration and Migration Policies
Policies of ASEAN countries to control unauthorized migration deal with various aspects
of the phenomenon. Countries of destination have addressed in particular border
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controls, sanctions against the employment of unauthorized migrants, and reducing the
number of unauthorized migrants through registration and repatriation. Penalties have
been increased for offenders, whether they be migrants, intermediaries, or employers.
Singapore has gone further, by addressing also the harbouring of unauthorized migrants.
Homeowners who provide lodging to such migrants can be put in jail. Of all the
measures, however, the one that is not implemented with sufficient resolve is the
inspection of job sites and imposition of penalties on employers who hire unauthorized
migrants. It appears particularly evident in Thailand and Malaysia that some sectors
small industries such as fisheries and plantationshave become dependent on un-
authorized labour. Employers are reluctant to assume the added labour costs that derive
from regularized migration. When it is enforced, migrants end up at the losing end, as
they are laid off or costs are passed on to them. Another policy aspect that is in-
sufficiently addressed is migration enforcement, where corruption is said to be rampant.
Countries of origin have attempted to address illegal recruitment as a crucial node in
the unauthorized-migration process. However, the balance between the interests of
Table  Share of Intra-ASEAN Import-Export (Selected Countries)
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government, private sectors, and migrants does not necessarily intersect at the zero
irregularity level. Ideally, recruiters should be the most adamant against unauthorized
migration because it translates into a loss of revenues for them. In fact, they are involved
in it, sometimes directly and sometimes in cooperative schemes with illegal recruiters.
Governments of origin do not favour unauthorized migration, but ultimately they see it
mostly as a problem of the countries of destination. The volume of migrants’ remittances
constitutes valuable contributions to their countries’ economic well-being (Table  ). As
for migrants, unauthorized migration offers some short-term advantages, the most
important one being fast deployment; hence they resort to it in spite of long-term
problems.
Developing a regional perspective on unauthorized migration has been attempted in
the region. In the mid-s the International Organization for Migration (IOM) initiated
a dialogue on unauthorized migration among Asian countries in Manila, and it has since
been called the Manila Process. In  a ministerial conference was organized in
Bangkok and ended with the Bangkok Declaration, highlighting commitments to cooper-
ate in addressing unauthorized migration. The Asian Regional Initiative Against Traf-
ficking (ARIAT) took place in Manila in March  at the initiative of the US and
Philippine governments to establish programmes and modes of cooperation to combat
trafficking in women and children. The latest of these regional initiatives was the Bali
Ministerial Conference on People-Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Trans-
national Crime convened by the governments of Australia and Indonesia during Febru-
ary , . It predictably ended with a low-profile statement by the co-chairs,
reiterating the need to share information and coordinate efforts. All these initiatives
were useful to further the discussion but ineffective in eliciting specific commitments
from participating governments.
What is difficult to determine is why, in spite of all the measures to combat it,
unauthorized migration continues to prosper. One reason is insufficient implementation.
But unauthorized migration also needs to be seen against a larger perspective. On the one
Table  Remittances to Selected ASEAN Countries, 
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hand, migrants are a by-product of globalization, which disrupts national labour markets
and redirects workers to internationalized labour markets; on the other, migrants are
excluded from the benefits of globalization, as they are not free to move where productiv-
ity is higher. Unauthorized migration can be considered to be the response of workers to
regulations of manpower, which during the process of globalization remain strictly local.
The ultimate solution, deregulating migration in favour of the free circulation of labour,
may appear utopian now. But the economic integration envisaged in ASEAN cannot be
successful until migrant labour is factored into it.
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